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Abstract 
The frequency of a power system can be compared to the heartbeats of a human. However, 
unlike for the human heart rate, it is vital that the frequency is kept stable at all time. 
Frequency deviations occur when the frequency is not kept stable. The deviations are used to 
measure frequency quality, which is an indication of the quality of power supply. The 
frequency quality has decreased the last ten years. This thesis identifies challenges of 
providing a sufficient frequency quality, and discusses economic solutions that Statnett as the 
TSO can implement to meet these challenges. The first part of the thesis presents the energy 
system. Based on this discussion we identify that rapid load changes, light system operation 
and wind power production represent important challenges in providing a sufficient frequency 
quality. We further discuss various solutions to deal with these challenges, focusing on 
economic based solutions of market design and incentives, rather than new technical 
solutions. As the energy system is interlinked and complex, the thesis takes a broad 
perspective. Thus, the thesis identifies and discusses several possible measures that we argue 
will benefit the future frequency quality of the system: - changing the time of trading units 
and interconnector ramping rules, - strengthening the intraday market, - introducing wind 
power brokers, - introducing new products in the option market for manual reserves, and - 
facilitate for flexible consumption.  
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List of abbreviations, organizations and technical terms 
TSO     Transmission System Operator 
Statnett   Norwegian TSO 
Energinet.dk   Danish TSO 
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Fingrid   Finish TSO 
TenneT   Dutch TSO (also TSO in a region of Germany) 
NVE   Norges Vassdrag og Energidirektorat (Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate) 
 
ELSPOT    Joint Nordic spot market 
ELBAS    Joint Nordic intraday market 
FCR    Frequency Containment Reserves 
FRR    Frequency Restoration Reserves 
RKM    Regulating Power Market 
RKOM   Regulating Power Option Market 
 
1 W     One Watt of instant effect  
1 Wh     One Watt of energy provided over one hour 
 
1 kW = 1000 W   1 kWh = 1000 Wh 
1 MW = 1000 kW   1 MWh = 1000 kWh 
1 GW = 1000 MW   1 GWh = 1000 MWh 
1 TW = 1000 GW   1 TWh = 1000 GWh 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Frequency – the heartbeat of the power system 
The frequency of a power system can be compared to the heartbeats of a human. However, 
unlike for the human heart rate, it is vital that the frequency is kept stable at all time. A too 
high or a too low frequency can cause severe damage or, in the worst case, make the 
electricity system collapse (Statnett SF 2012a). Deviations from the frequency can in this way 
be seen as a weakening of the security of power supply. In general, the term frequency is 
defined as the number of times a specific incident occurs within a amount of time 
(TechTerms.com 2011). For electricity, frequency is measured in hertz (Hz). Hertz is used to 
quantify the amount of times that energy changes direction within one second (Statnett SF 
2012b). Most power systems, including the Norwegian system has a frequency of 50 Hz.  
 
We can think of the energy system as a pair of scales in order to understand the concept of 
frequency. Production and import is on one scale, and consumption and export on the other.  
The balance between the amount of electricity fed into the system and taken out has to be 
exactly the same at all time in order for one of the scales not to tip the other over (Statnett SF 
2012b). If more electricity goes into the system than out, even for a moment, the frequency 
increases. If more electricity is taken out of the system than fed in, the frequency decreases. 
Balancing power must be used if there are imbalances between the two scales. Balancing 
power is available production capacity allocated for the purpose of balancing the frequency. 
Figure 1: The frequency as a pair of scales. Own figure 
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1.2. Falling frequency quality 
A frequency deviation occurs whenever there is an imbalance in the system. If the frequency 
falls or rises more than 0,1 Hz from 50 Hz, its defined as a frequency deviation. The 
frequency quality of a power system can be measured as the accumulated minutes of 
frequency deviations within a given time frame, or alternatively, the number of times the 
frequency deviates within a given timeframe (Statnett SF 2012b). An increase in frequency 
deviations indicates falling frequency quality.  
 
Norway is part of a joint power system called the Nordic synchronous system with Sweden, 
Finland and Eastern Denmark. The system has a joint frequency, as it is one interlinked 
system. (Statnett SF 2012b) Figure 2 shows that the minutes of frequency deviations in the 
Nordic synchronous system has been increasing gradually the last ten years. The result is a 
decreasing frequency quality and a weakened security of power supply.  
 
It is the Transmission System Operators’ (TSO) responsibility to handle energy imbalances by 
the use of balancing power. The TSO´s are the operators of the national transmission grid, 
which are natural monopolists. Statnett is TSO in Norway, and share the balancing 
responsibility with the TSOs in the other Nordic countries. (Statnett SF 2012b) This thesis 
will limit its focus to Statnett’s part of the balancing responsibility.  
Figure 2: Development of frequency deviations (1995 - 2011).  
(Statnett SF 2012b) 
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1.3. Challenges and solutions 
The power system is growing in complexity. Figure 3, which is adapted from Statnett 
(2012a), shows how the development of different factors is expected to increase the 
complexity of the power system between 2012 and 2020. Changes in production and 
consumption, political conditions, international integration, weather, technology and cross 
border trading are all a part of this growing complexity. This is also the main reason why it 
has become harder to balance the power system. This development is expected to continue in 
the future (Statnett SF 2012a). It is expected that the frequency quality will continue to 
decrease if actions are not made (Statnett SF 2012b). 
 
The subject of frequency quality is interesting and important because the frequency is so vital 
to the power system. The thesis first identifies main challenges of maintaining a sufficient 
frequency quality in the future, and then discusses economic measures that Statnett can 
introduce to improve the frequency quality in the future. These include modifications of 
already existing market solution, as well as new ideas. The main challenges and the suggested 
solutions of the thesis may be summarized as follows:  -­‐ Rapid load changes in the system are increasingly contributing to imbalances. The 
markets for planned trade of power are insufficient in handling load changes. This 
may be improved by a market design based on shorter trading units in the markets for 
planned trade combined with continuous ramping on the interconnectors.  
Figure 3: Main development for system operation between 2012 and 2020.  Adapted from (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 12 
-­‐ Light system operation occurs when the system is operated with a low amount of 
balancing power capacity. The system becomes less robust to handle energy 
imbalances in these situations. The introduction of down-regulating options for 
manual reserves may increase the bids and the capacity available in RKM and thereby 
provide more available capacity.  -­‐ Wind power is unregulated and highly unpredictable. More wind power can cause 
increased energy imbalances in the future. The undesired features of wind power can 
be addressed by increasing trade in the intraday market, introducing brokers for wind 
power, implementing shorter trading units in the markets for planned trade and 
implementing down-regulating options for manual reserves.  -­‐ Flexible demand can contribute to increased frequency quality. This solution does not 
derive from a specific challenge for the frequency, but can contribute by providing 
manual reserves and a more even load pattern.  
 
1.4. Structure 
The Norwegian energy system and the markets for planned trade of power is presented in 
chapter 2, providing an understanding of the system which is necessary in addressing 
solutions for providing an increased frequency quality. Chapter 3 focuses on balancing power, 
as well as markets for balancing power where Statnett obtain the necessary services to balance 
the power system. We discuss three main challenges for providing an improved frequency 
quality in chapter 4. Possible solutions, based on economic theory, to the three main 
challenges, will be discussed in chapter 5 – 7. Chapter 5 will address the challenge of rapid 
load changes and frequency deviations around hourly shifts. In chapter 6 wind power will be 
discussed, as it is expected that wind power will contribute to increased system imbalances. 
This chapter also addresses the aspect of light system operation. Chapter 7 discusses the 
advantages of flexible demand in maintaining the frequency quality. Chapter 8 gives a 
summary of the thesis.  
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2. The electricity system 
The energy balance in the power system and the need for frequency regulations are 
determined by the actions of the system participants. The producers produce electricity, which 
the consumers use. In addition, cross border trading affects the energy load. All the actions 
add up to the net balance of energy in the system at any given time and they determine if the 
pair of scales is kept leveled or tips in one direction. This will cause a frequency deviation 
that must be handled to restore the frequency. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
 
The structure of the power system can be seen in Figure 4 where the main system participants 
are presented. Produced electricity is transported into the transmission grid, which is operated 
by the system operators1. It is then distributed to consumers. The producers and consumers 
trade in open markets for planned trade of electricity, called the spot- and intraday markets. 
(Statnett SF 2012b) The transmission grids are natural monopolies, operated by regulated 
transmission companies. This deregulated market system makes it possible for producers and 
consumers to act in open markets, which gives a more economically efficient system. We will 
look at system participants and their actions in chapter 2.1 and the markets for planned trade 
in 2.2.  
Figure 4: The electricity system with electricity flow, system participants and market 
organization. Own figure. 
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2.1. System participants 
2.1.1. Consumers 
This thesis has chosen to divide consumers into two main groups of interest, given their 
differences in size, consumption pattern and market participation: 
 
The industrial industry is one of the two main consumer groups of electricity. The group’s 
total energy consumption in a normal year is approximately 600 GWh per week, and not 
dependent upon season (Olje- og energidepartementet 1998). This accounts for roughly 25 % 
of the total Norwegian energy consumption in a year. The industrial firms are active market 
participants, as electricity is one of their most important factor inputs. 
 
Individual consumers, such as households, office buildings, malls and other power users of 
less energy intensive scale, are the other main group of consumers. They do not directly trade 
in the markets for electricity, but purchase from an electricity provider. The electricity 
providers trade in the electricity market and act as aggregated consumers on behalf of all their 
clients. The consumer group use from 1000 to 3000 GWh/week (Statnett SF 2012b), and 
account for approximately 75 % of Norway’s energy consumption in a year (Olje- og 
energidepartementet 1998). Unlike the industrial consumers, the individual consumer group 
has a distinct pattern of consumption for years, weeks and days. The patterns can be seen in 
Figure 5, 6 and 7: 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 Local Transmission Operators (LSO) are not included in the figure. 
Figure 5: Average daily consumption pattern for week 3, 2013 and week 24, 2012. 
(Nord Pool Spot 2013a) 
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 -­‐ The daily consumption starts at a low level in the night, spikes in the morning, is kept 
high during the day and then falls in the evening. This pattern follows the daily 
rhythms of society.  -­‐ The weekly consumption pattern consists of seven-day patterns where the weekend 
has a lower level of energy usage than the weekdays.  -­‐ The yearly consumption pattern is negatively correlated with outside temperature, as 
heating is an important usage of electricity in Norway. This gives high consumption in 
the winter, falling in the spring, low in the summer and rising in the fall.  
 
There are three important aspects regarding the group’s consumption of energy: 
Figure 7: Yearly consumption in weekly numbers for 2012 and 2013 (Nord Pool Spot 2013a) 
Figure 6: Consumption pattern for week 24, 2012 and week 3, 2013. (Nord Pool Spot 2013a)   
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-­‐ Consumption has high uncertainty and is difficult to forecast.  -­‐ The consumption load changes continuously.  -­‐ Consumption has rapid changes in the morning and in the evening. 
The combination of the three implies that it can be difficult to know what actual consumption 
of electricity will be before the operating moment. This is a challenge for keeping a stable 
energy balance in the system.  
 
2.1.2. Producers 
This thesis has chosen to divide producers into three groups, based on their differences in 
production regulation possibilities and technology:  
 
Hydropower producers with storage capacity, also called flexible producers, generate 
about 70% of Norway’s power in a normal year (Olje- og energidepartemenet 2012a). The 
storage is done in large dams or lakes, called reservoirs, and electricity is produced by tapping 
water from the reservoirs into tubes with turbines. Production plants have high investment 
costs, but low marginal costs since the “fuel” of hydropower is rainwater. However, the water 
used in hydropower production does have a value called water value. The water value 
represents the opportunity cost of saving water for production on a later occasion when prices 
are higher, compared to using the water for production now at current prices. The water value 
makes out most of the producers’ marginal costs and is therefore an important parameter in 
their production decisions. (Olje- og energidepartementet 1998)  
 
Hydropower producers without storage capacity, also called unregulated hydropower, 
account for 27 % of Norway’s power production in a normal year (Olje- og 
energidepartemenet 2012a). Unlike the hydropower producers with storage capacity this 
group consists of producers without any possibility to decide when to produce or not to 
produce electricity. The plants are located in rivers where the water flow is converted into 
energy, using turbines. The investment costs of the unregulated hydropower plants are high, 
but their marginal costs are close to zero and do not include water value as water cannot be 
stored. This implies that the producers have an inelastic supply curve. 
 
Figure 8 shows the production pattern over a year for both groups of hydropower production 
and a graph indicating water inflow into their reservoirs and water pathways.  
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 -­‐ The unregulated hydropower production is correlated with the inflow graph, as the 
inflow is what determines their production.  -­‐ Flexible production is negatively correlated with water inflow. This is because water 
inflow is highest in the summer months, while the electricity demand and prices are 
highest in the winter months. The producers can, given their storage capacity, hereby 
build up reservoir levels in the warm months to meet consumption needs in the colder 
months when water inflow is low. 
 
Wind power production is the third producer group of interest in the Norwegian electricity 
system. Although wind power only has a share of approximately 1% of the total production 
capacity in Norway, they are included in this thesis because they are expected to gain 
significance in the future due to the green certificate market for electricity (Statnett SF 2011a) 
(Olje- og energidepartementet 2012b). Wind power is produced by transforming wind into 
energy using windmills. The production is unregulated and dependent upon wind speed. Like 
for unregulated hydropower production the investment costs in wind power are high, but the 
marginal costs are close to zero. However, unlike for unregulated hydropower, wind power 
production is a much less predictable power source. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) 
 
2.1.3. Electricity export and import 
In addition to producers and consumers cross border trading also affects the energy balance. 
Norway has several connections, both to countries within the Nordic synchronous system and 
Figure 8: Graphs for hydropower production and water inflow in a typical year. (Olje- 
og energidepartemenet 2012a) 
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outside of it. Capacity information by country is summarized in Table 1. (Olje- og 
energidepartementet 2012c) 
 
Cross border trading between Norway and countries outside of the Nordic synchronous 
system will be of main interest for this thesis. This is because these trades affect the net 
energy loads in the system, something that cross border trading within the synchronous 
system doesn’t do. Electricity exchange outside the Nordic synchronous system is done using 
interconnectors, which are cables connecting countries in different synchronous systems. 
(Statnett SF 2012a) The cable is usually a high voltage direct current cable (a HVDC-cable). 
Changes in the load on an interconnector, called ramping, may potentially have a great impact 
on the balance of the energy system. As of today is the total transmission capacity of the 
interconnectors linking Norway with countries outside of the Nordic synchronous system 
1700 MW. In 2020 is this capacity expected to be 5200 MW (Statnett SF 2012b).  
 
The countries connected to Norway through interconnectors are mainly thermal dominated 
production systems. These systems have a more defined and volatile price structure over the 
day than Norway has, mainly because of significant start- and stop costs for thermal power 
production facilities (Olje- og energidepartemenet 2012a). This often results in import to 
Norway during the night and export in the daytime. Thus, the interconnectors are often turned 
two times a day. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
 
Cross border trading is important for Norway because the variations in domestic power 
production can be large between wet and dry years. Norway is dependent upon net import in 
dry years, to secure their energy supply, but can take advantage of the cables for export in wet 
Table 1: Cross border trading capacity. Own figure based on (Olje- og energidepartementet 2012c) 
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years to avoid spillage of water. (Olje- og energidepartemenet 2012a) It is expected that 
Norway will be net exporter of power for most years by 2020, given investments in new 
renewable energy. (Statnett SF 2012b). The interconnectors are important so that excess 
power can be exported in the future (Hope 2011). 
 
2.1.4. Important elements regarding system participants 
We have seen that the energy balance in the system depends upon the actions of system actors 
and cross border trade. There are five key elements that we need to keep in mind for the rest 
of this paper: -­‐ Consumption varies a lot over the day and within the year. This implies that 
production loads must change in the same way. -­‐ Flexible hydropower production has the ability to regulate their production, which the 
unregulated hydropower and wind power does not. -­‐ Wind power production is highly unpredictable and difficult to forecast. -­‐ The differences in price patterns between Norway and thermal dominated power 
systems most often lead to export from Norway during the day and import during the 
night.  -­‐ The total cross border transmission capacity between Norway and countries outside 
of the Nordic synchronous system are expected to increase by 3500 MW the next 
eight years. 
The actions of producers and consumers furthermore follow from trade in electricity markets, 
and thus also enforced by the incentives of these markets. 
 
2.2. Markets for planned trade  
There are different markets connected to trade of electricity. We have commodity markets for 
energy, financial markets and markets where ancillary services are traded. This part of the 
thesis will look into the commodity markets for electricity. These are markets where trade 
occurs ahead of the operating moment, and where production is planned to meet real 
consumption so that the energy balance is maintained. The markets can be called markets for 
planned trade, i.e. planned production and consumption, and consist of the spot market, which 
is a day-ahead market, and the intraday market (Statnett SF 2012b). The spot- and intraday 
markets are open Nordic power markets covering Norway, Sweden, Finland, East-Denmark, 
Lithuania and Estonia. However, market participants from other countries are also allowed to 
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trade. Most of the trade is done on the commodity exchange Nord Pool Spot, owned by the 
TSOs of the countries in the market (Nord Pool Spot 2013c).  
 
In addition to the spot- and intraday market there also is bilateral trade in form of agreements 
between actors in the system. (Statnett SF 2012b) These agreements can be defined as a part 
of markets for planning, even though the trade does not occur through organized markets.  
 
2.2.1. The spot market 
The spot market, called ELSPOT, is the main market for trade of electricity in the Nordic 
power market. The commodity trade was 432 TWh in 2012, by 320 companies from 20 
countries (Nord Pool Spot 2013b). ELSPOT is operated on a daily basis covering the 
following 24 hours of the next day, for which 24 different hourly contracts are traded, that is 
24 units each covering 60-minute of the next day. The market is cleared using a market 
algorithm that aggregates supply and demand curves based upon bids from producers and 
consumers. The algorithm also incorporates transmission constraints in the grid. NordPool 
Spot is responsible for publishing information regarding price, volume and cross border 
trading quantities after the markets is cleared. Accepted bids become binding contracts for 
physical delivery and reception of electricity for the next day. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
 
Figure 9 shows the timeline for trade in the spot market:  
 
 
Figure 9: Timeline for trade in the spot market. Own figure 
 -­‐ The capacity constraints in the transmission grid are reported by the TSOs between 
07:00 and 10:00 in the morning.  -­‐ The market opens for bids from producers and consumers at 08:00 and closes at 12:00.  -­‐ The cleared market information is made public between 12:30 and 12:45.  
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-­‐ The producers are obligated to hand in production plans for the following day within 
19:00. These plans are important for the planning that Statnett needs to do in order to 
adjust production to consumption for the next day. Large producers, with capacity 
over 200 MW, are obligated to define their plans in 15-minute units. Statnett has the 
possibility to move production in the plans, within the interval of one quarter of an 
hour. For example, if a producer has planned to start production at 08:00, Statnett can 
order them to move the production start within the time interval of 07:45 to 08:15. The 
producers are compensated for these movements according to spot market prices. 
(Statnett SF 2012c)  
 
The design of the spot market holds three features that create challenges for keeping a stable 
balance in a way that is economically desirable: -­‐ The binding contracts for delivery and reception of electricity are made from 12 to 36 
hours before actual delivery. Important parameters that affect consumption or 
production can change during this time period. -­‐ Consumption load, and therefore also production, changes continuously. However, the 
market is cleared in 60-minute units where the producers and consumers are obligated 
by the market to be in balance within each hour. The mismatch between market 
structure and continuous load changes is the main reason why Statnett is dependent 
upon exercising production movements.  -­‐ Statnett can make production movements after the large producers hand in their 
production plans. However, Statnett doesn’t have perfect information to make these 
production movements in an economically optimal way.  
All these challenges are important with respect to the frequency quality of the system, and 
will be discussed in great detail later in this thesis.  
 
2.2.2. The intraday market 
The intraday market, called ELBAS, is designed as a supplementary market to ELSPOT. It 
opens after the spot market is cleared and is used so that producers and consumers can alter 
their spot market obligations if new information occurs. Trade in ELBAS is done on a 
continuous basis and contracts are entered into at varying prices, depending on the bids. It is 
only possible to trade in ELBAS if there is spare capacity available in the transmission grid. 
This might not be the case after the spot market is cleared, especially not for cross border 
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trading. Like for ELSPOT, the contracts in ELBAS are binding contracts that require physical 
delivery or reception of electricity. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
 
Figure 10 shows the timeline of trade in ELBAS:  
 
-­‐ The market opens at 15:00.  -­‐ ELBAS closes two hours before operating hour for Norwegian market participants. 
Closing time in most other countries in the market is one hour before operating hour. 
Statnett is expected to adapt this gate closure time in 2015. (Statnett SF 2012a) -­‐ After ELBAS is closed producers must hand in any alterations they may have done in 
their production plans. These altered production plans must be handed in not later than 
45 minutes before the operating hour.  
 
The intraday market provides two important advantages for the system:  -­‐ Market participants can aim to maximize their profit as information changes over 
time. -­‐ It is easier for the for system actors to uphold their balancing obligations. If a market 
participant obtains new information regarding production or consumption implying 
that he will not be able to fulfill his contract obligations, then these imbalances can be 
traded off in ELBAS. Foreseen imbalances can in this way be dealt with ahead of the 
operating moment, instead of when they occur. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
Norwegian producers and consumers seldom use ELBAS, regardless of the advantages that it 
provides both market participants and Statnett. There are several reasons for this, but the most 
obvious reason is that production sources in Norway today are highly predictable. (Statnett SF 
Figure 10: Timeline for trade in the intraday market 
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2012a) However, we might expect this to change in the future, given investments in new 
renewable energy.  
 
2.2.3. Price development in the markets for planned trade 
How prices in these markets will develop in the future will have important effects on the 
outcome of the discussions made later in this thesis. This is because a lot of the arguments 
made in the text are affected by expected prices. There are two important questions regarding 
price development for electricity, which we need to address. The first is a question of price 
level and the other of price structure. 
 
The price level in the markets for planning is expected to change in the future for two 
reasons:  -­‐ Investments in new renewable energy production indicates that prices for electricity 
will decrease, everything else held constant. (Bye 2003) -­‐ The building of interconnectors indicates that prices for electricity will increase, given 
the current lower price levels in Norway than surrounding countries. (THEMA, Pöyry 
2010) 
The report “Challenges for the Nordic Power – How to handle the renewable electricity 
surplus” by THEMA Consulting Group and Pöyry Management Consulting (THEMA, Pöyry 
2010) indicates that the future holds a decrease of energy prices in the short run (before 2018 
-2020), and a increase in the long run (after 2018-2020). Other articles also underline this 
development as the most probable in the future (Hope 2011).  
 
The price structure within each day is closely related to consumption, as can be seen in 
Figure 11, where prices for electricity in Oslo are displayed for the same periods as in Figure 
5, which displayed consumption. We can conclude with a strong positive correlation between 
consumption and prices within days. It’s expected that the price pattern will become more 
volatile in the future, given an increase in cross border trade. (IPA Consulting, Econnect Ltd 
& Martin Energy 2006). We can, on the other hand, expect that the price pattern will become 
less specific, due to the fact that wind power production will affect prices from day to day 
randomly, depending upon the weather. 
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2.3. Imbalances may occur 
It is the combination of all actions that system participants make that determine the energy 
balance in the system at any given time. However, their actions are determined by the 
obligations they make in the day-ahead and intraday markets. So, how can we use this insight 
to provide an improved frequency quality? To be able to answer this question, we first need to 
obtain information regarding how the energy balance is restored if the system participants tip 
the pair of scales out of balance. 
Figure 11: Average price for one day in week 24, 2012 and week 3, 2013. (Nord Pool 
Spot 2013e) 
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3. Maintaining frequency balance  
The day-ahead and intraday markets are cleared in balance for the 60-minute units that are 
traded. However, consumption changes continuously within the hour, and actors are not 
always able to meet their market obligations, due to forecasting error or operational problems. 
This can result in energy imbalances that must be handled so that the frequency can be 
restored at 50 Hz. Statnett, as TSO, is responsible for balancing the frequency and monitors 
the situation continuously. They use ancillary services involving different kinds of reserves to 
keep a stable balance in the system. Statnett does not own the reserves, but obtains them 
through markets specially designed for this purpose, where they operate as the only buyer. 
Producers and some consumers operate as sellers. The different types of reserves will be 
presented in chapter 3.1 and the markets for the reserves in 3.2. 
 
3.1 Types of reserves 
Statnett uses three types of reserves to balance the frequency. These are Frequency 
Containment Reserves (FCR)2, Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR)3 and regulating 
reserves, also called manual reserves. FCR and FRR are rotating automatic reserves, which 
implies that only large hydro producers with reservoir capacity can supply them in Norway.4 
This is because a physical momentum is needed for rotating automatic reserves (Statnett SF 
2012b). A reserve is rotating if the aggregate providing the reserve capacity is in use (rotates). 
The manual reserves are, however, not rotating and can in theory be supplied by all producers 
and consumer with the desired flexibility (Statnett SF 2012b).  
 
Figure 12 gives a good picture of how frequency is balanced, using the three types of 
reserves: -­‐ The FCRs starts balancing the frequency within seconds after a frequency deviation 
occurs. The turbines that produce electricity in hydropower plants are attached to 
frequency monitors and will automatically increase or decrease production as the 
frequency changes. FCRs are designed to help restore the frequency balance from zero 
to two minutes after the frequency deviation occurs. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
                                                
2 FCR consist of two types of reserves. These are FNR and FDR.  
3 Often referred to as LFC, as LFC accounts for a significant share of FRR.   
4 Thermal power can also provide automatic reserves, but this is not a part of Norway’s production mix. 
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-­‐ The FRRs takes over the balancing responsibility from FCRs within 120-210 seconds 
after the frequency deviation occurs.  They are designed to function up to five minutes 
after the deviation and are important because they make it possible for the FCRs to 
reset and be ready to handle new potential imbalances. Unlike the FCRs, Statnett must 
activate the FRRs even though they are automatic rotating reserves. FRR was 
implemented in the Norwegian power system in 2012. (Statnett SF 2012b).  -­‐ The regulating reserves are operated manually by the employees in charge at the 
system operator’s central at Statnett. The choice of reserves is based on bids from 
producers and consumers offering to reduce or increase their production or 
consumption. They are activated from two to fifteen minutes after the frequency 
deviation occurs and should be used until the frequency is stabilized on 50 Hz. 
(Statnett SF 2012b) 
 
3.2 Markets for ancillary services  
3.2.1. The market for Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR) 
FCRs are automatic reserves and the system’s first defense when frequency deviations occur. 
The market is a pure Norwegian market, as FCRs need to be evenly distributed 
geographically around in the power system, and thus normally will not be traded across 
country borders (Statnett SF 2012b). However, it is possible to trade FCRs between TSOs 
when this is required. In this case the TSOs trade reserve capacity with each other, and not 
Figure 12: The usage of the different types of reserves. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
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through market participants in the market for FCR. (Statnett SF 2010) To be able to provide 
FCR capacity, the producers need to have entered into binding obligations for supply in the 
markets for planned trade. This is because they need to have running production in order to 
produce FCR. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
 
The FCR market consists of a week-based and a day-based market. The timeline displayed in 
Figure 13 shows when bidding and delivery is done in the market: 
 
 
Figure 13: Timeline for bids and delivery in the market for FCR. Own figure based upon (Statnett SF 2011b) 
 
The week-based market deals with the supply of FCR covering either the weekdays, or the 
weekend period. Bidding closes on Thursdays for the following weekend (A in the figure) and 
on Fridays for the following weekdays (B in the figure). All days in the week-based market 
consists of three units, night (00:00 – 08:00), day (08:00 – 20:00) and evening (20:00 – 
24:00). The market is opened for bids eight days before it closes. (Statnett SF 2011b) 
 
The day-based market for FCR opens the day before delivery and closes at 19:00. The 
producers receive information regarding the outcome of the market at 20:00. The day is split 
into 24 60-minute units. The daily market is important because it provides the producers with 
the opportunity to act in the market for FCR after they have received information regarding 
the clearance of the spot market (Statnett SF 2012b). All bids in the market can be done 
actively or passively, where a passive bid implies that the bidder accepts whatever price 
provided. (Statnett SF 2010) The prices in both the week-based and day-based markets are set 
at prices of the marginal accepted bids (Statnett SF 2011b).  
 
Figure 14 shows the price pattern in the week-based market for FCR in the price zone NO2 in 
2012 (Nord Pool Spot 2013d). The prices in the market are negatively correlated with power 
consumption. This is because FCRs are produced by flexible hydropower where production is 
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positively correlated with consumption. The prices in the market for FCR will increase when 
production from flexible hydropower is low because this limits the capacity to provide the 
reserves. Remember that the producers must have accepted bids in the market for planning in 
order to deliver FCR capacity.  (Statnett SF 2012a) The prices for FCR are mostly higher in 
the weekends than weekdays. This is because power demand is usually lower in weekends.  
 
3.2.2. The market for Frequency Restoration Reserves (FRR) 
FRRs are automatic reserves and represent the system’s second line of defense when 
frequency deviations occur. The FRR market has only been in operation since 2012, since the 
use of this reserve is new. Research indicates that FRRs make an important contribution to 
improved frequency quality. This is mainly because use of the FRRs enables resetting the 
FCRs, thus making them available to tackle new imbalances. (Statnett SF 2012a) The FRR 
market is a national market, but Statnett can make bids available for other TSOs in the Nordic 
synchronous system. At the same time Statnett can use bids made available by the other 
TSOs. (Statnett SF 2012d) Like for FCR, producers need to have binding production 
obligations in the markets for planned traded to be able to provide FRR capacity. (Statnett SF 
2012b) 
 
The FRR market is a week-based market and the timeline displayed in Figure 15 shows 
bidding and delivery information: 
Figure 14: Prices in the week-based market for FCR in 2012 from price zone NO2. 
(Nord Pool Spot 2013d) 
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Figure 15: Timeline in the market for trade of FRR. Own figure based upon (Statnett SF 2012d) 
 
This week-based market closes at 13:00 on Thursdays, where bids for delivery the following 
week are submitted. All days in the market are divided into night-, day- and evening units, 
with the same time frame as in the week-based market for FCR. Prices are set to be the price 
level of the marginally accepted bid. Bids are normally accepted in their entirety, or not at all. 
The bids in the market are separate for up- and down regulation of production, and are cleared 
at different prices. (Statnett SF 2012d) Even though the market has not been run for a full 
year, we can assume that the price pattern in the market will be as the pattern in the market for 
FCR. This is because FCRs and FRRs have the same price drivers.  
 
3.2.3. The market for regulating reserves 
The manual reserves are the system’s third line of defense when frequency deviations occur, 
and it is their responsibility to restore frequency at 50 Hz. The market for manual reserves is 
called the Regulating Power Market (RKM), and is a joint Nordic market. All producers and 
consumers can in theory make bids in RKM as long as they fulfill the technical requirements. 
However, flexible hydropower producers and industrial consumers are the only actors 
involved today, given their flexibility to regulate. (Statnett SF 2012b).  
 
RKM is a day-based market, and the timeline displayed in Figure 16 shows bidding and 
delivery information: 
 
Figure 16: Timeline for trade in RKM. Own figure based upon (Statnett SF 2009) 
 
This day-based market closes at 20:00 every day for delivery the next day. All bids are made 
on basis of compensation for producers or consumers in order to alter their production or 
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consumption within 15 minutes notice. The bids in the market are separate for up- and down 
regulation, and are cleared at different prices. If there is a need for up-regulation within the 
hour, then the price of the marginally accepted bid sets the up-regulating price and is used for 
all accepted bids. The same approach to pricing applies to down-regulation. If there is a need 
for both up- and down regulation within the same hour, the price for the net value of the most 
utilized regulation will be used. (Statnett SF 2009) The bidding units in the market are 60-
minute units.   
 
Although Statnett is the only buyer in RKM, they are not responsible for the payment of all 
utilized reserves. If manual reserves are used for balancing purposes when consumers or 
producers deviates from their plans (energy obligations per hour), then these actors will be 
charged for the regulation. The settlements are done according to a specter of conditions and 
will include a percentage of the cost of FCR and FRR, as well as the cost of manual reserves 
and a fixed imbalance fee. (Statnett SF, 2009)If regulations are done because of an error 
connected to the transmission grid, balancing requirements within the hour, or if special 
regulations are made because of capacity constraints, then Statnett is responsible for payment. 
(Statnett SF 2012b)   
 
3.2.4. The option market for regulating reserves 
Statnett is obligated to have at least 1200 MW capacity in bids in RKM at all times. They 
have, in addition decided to have 800 MW extra, that is in total 2000 MW (Statnett SF 
2012b). To ensure that sufficient capacity is bid into RKM, an option market has been 
created, called the Regulating Power Option Market (RKOM). This market is used between 
fall and spring. There are only option-products for up-regulating capacity in the market today. 
This is because there has, up until now, not been a need for options to ensure down-regulating 
capacity in RKM. Prices in RKOM are set to at the marginal accepted bid. (Statnett SF 2012e)  
 
RKOM consists of a seasonal and a week-based market. The timeline displayed in Figure 17 
shows when bidding and delivery is done: 
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Figure 17: Timeline for trade in RKOM. Own figure based upon (Statnett SF 2012e) 
 
Each year the seasonal market is operated for the period that Statnett needs, usually in the 
period between weeks 45 to 16. The bids in the seasonal market are made for the entire 
season, but the time interval of usage per day is only in the hours between 05:00 and 24:00.  
(Statnett SF 2012e) 
 
The week-based market is run from week to week, if there is a need. Trade closes Fridays at 
12:00 and provides bids for the following week. The bids are divided into night (00:00 - 
00:05) and day (05:00 – 24:00) for each day of the week. (Statnett SF 2012e) 
 
3.2.5. Bilateral agreements for manual reserve capacity 
In addition to ensuring sufficient bids for manual reserves through RKOM, Statnett also 
enters into additional long-term bilateral contracts with producers, binding them to deliver 
bids in RKM. The contracts are usually a result of a two-way deal, where Statnett has assisted 
financially in upgrading production capacity at the producer’s plants and the producers have 
agreed to provide manual reserve capacity. (Statnett SF 2013) 
 
3.3. Alternatives to using reserves 
The pre-planned obligations of producers and consumers for production and consumption of 
electricity follow from the contracts entered into in ELSPOT, ELBAS as well as bilateral 
contracts. This determines the pre-planned energy balance. Reserves must be used to handle 
energy imbalances, if they occur. The market system may to some extent give incentives that 
reduce the need of reserves, for example by charging participants for deviations between real 
delivery/production and the contract obligations. Unfortunately, it is impossible to eliminate 
all system imbalances. An important question is, however, whether market system conditions 
or market design can be altered to further improve frequency quality, and reduce the need of 
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balancing services? We must first define the main challenges that cause a falling frequency 
quality, in order to answer this question.  
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4. Challenges of keeping a stable frequency 
Decreasing frequency quality has been a growing concern for Statnett the last ten years. This 
chapter identifies three main challenges where we believe improved market design can 
contribute to an enhanced frequency quality of the system. Firstly, the system is especially 
vulnerable at times of large and rapid load changes, in particular occurring in the morning and 
in the evening (Statnett SF 2012b). Secondly, scarcity of sufficient rotating reserves seems to 
be an increasing and upcoming problem, this especially occurs in the spring and summer, 
when the electricity system is often run as a “light system” (Statnett SF 2012b). Thirdly, 
increased future wind power in the system also represents a threat to future levels of 
frequency(Nilssen, et al. 2010) (Brooker 2012). These challenges are further explained and 
discussed below, pointing to possible solutions of market design that can contribute to 
improved frequency quality. 
 
4.1. Rapid load changes  
Rapid load changes can cause severe problems for the system balance, as it can be difficult to 
adjust production at the same rate. The two periods with the largest load changes are in the 
morning and in the evening, mainly for two reasons: -­‐ Consumption increases in the morning and decreases in the evening. -­‐ The interconnectors often ramp from import to export in the morning, and from export 
to import in the evening.  
The two load changes have the same “direction”, i.e. with an increase in load in the morning, 
and a decrease in total load in the evening. Thus, both enforce the load change. This is in 
contrast to countries interconnected with Norway. Here ramping has an absorbing effect on 
the load changes from consumption, thereby making energy balancing easier.  
 
The problem can easily be identified by looking at Figure 18. Here are frequency deviations 
displayed in minutes for a year, shown for what part of the day they occur. The graph gives us 
a clear image of the stipulated problem. A significant share of frequency deviations occurs in 
the morning and evening and the frequency deviation throughout the day are around the 
hourly shifts as the pattern in the figure indicates (It can be difficult to recognize from the 
figure but the spikes that occur each hour are around the hourly shifts). (Statnett SF 2012b) 
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Rapid load changes cause frequency deviations because the system is not optimally designed 
to handle them. Hence, the load changes must be handled by reserves when they should have 
been handled by the systems design. The frequency deviations occur most frequently around 
the hourly shift. This is mainly because the contracts defined in the spot market and the 
intraday markets are hourly contracts. Thus the market is cleared by 60-minute units, 
implying planned changes around the hour. In contrast, however, the actual load changes 
continuous. (Statnett SF 2012b) This implies that the imbalances that occur between the 
implied production by contracts on one hand and actual consumption on the other, can be 
large when the load changes are rapid.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses this problem introducing two interlinked solutions: -­‐ Redefining contracts in the markets for planned traded to cover shorter delivery 
periods may contribute to better align production with consumption. -­‐ Changing the ramping rules of interconnectors may ease and absorb consequences of 
load changes on the interconnectors.  
Both these suggested changes in market design are envisaged to make the system better able 
to handle rapid load changes than within the current system.  
 
In addition, measures to promote a more flexible demand may also offer opportunities for a 
better balance of supply and demand, thus also contributing to a more stable frequency and 
less demand for reserves. This is the topic of chapter 7. 
 
Figure 18: Frequency deviations over one day. (Statnett SF 2012b) 
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4.2. Light system operation 
In order to be able to deliver down-regulating reserve capacity in RKM and rotating reserves 
in the markets for FCR and FRR, the flexible power plants must be actively producing 
electricity. However, there might occur situations where the production mix in the system 
consists of little flexible production. This is characterized as a “light” system operation. 
Increased instances of light system operation becomes a problem because the system thus is 
less robust to handle energy imbalances. The result is decreasing frequency quality. (Statnett 
SF 2012b) 
 
Light system operation can occur in the spring after snow melting starts and in the summer. It 
happens most often in the night, when demand is low and when there can be cross border 
import. Both supply and demand factors in the markets for planning cause light system 
operation, as displayed in Figure 19.  
-­‐ Consumption falls in the spring and summer, given an inwards shift in the demand 
curve from D0 to D1.  -­‐ The unregulated producers supply curve shifts outwards from S0U to S1U, given higher 
water inflow to their pathways. The curve is inelastic because the producers are 
unregulated and their production will not be affected by price. The aggregated supply 
curve shifts from S0 to S1.  
Figure 19: Demand and supply shifts lead to light system operation. Own figure. 
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-­‐ Prices fall from P0 to P1. -­‐ Total production falls from Q0 to Q1. Since unregulated production is increased from 
Q0U to Q1U, flexible production will decrease production from Q0F to Q1F.  -­‐ The outcome is light system operation with a lower level of rotating reserve capacity 
and lower down-regulating capacity for manual reserves.   
Wind power production and cross border trading capacity are both expected to increase in the 
future. By doing so is the unregulated supply curve shifted out. This will further increase the 
challenge of light system operations in the spring and summer. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 
Light system operation is a threat to frequency quality because the system becomes less 
robust to handle energy imbalances. One measure to ease this problem, seen from an 
economic perspective would be to increase the available reserve capacity. Chapter 6.3.4. 
presents the solution of introducing down-regulating capacity options in RKOM for the spring 
and summer. The measures in 5.1 and 5.2 will also have a positive effect for the situation of 
light system operation. This is because more reserve capacity will be made available by 
implementing the suggested changes in market design.  
 
4.3. Unpredictable wind power  
Wind power producers can only to a limited extent control their actions since wind power is 
both unregulated as well as highly unpredictable. This causes a great threat to frequency 
quality in three ways: (Statnett SF 2012a) (Statnett SF 2012b) -­‐ Wind power production is dependent upon wind, which cannot be forecasted 
accurately. Thus, bids from wind power in the markets for planning are only rough 
estimates of what production will be. The difference between traded and actual 
production quantities thus creates imbalances that must be handled.   -­‐ Wind power will increase balancing problems under light system operation. They will 
lead to lower levels of flexible production, and at the same time to more system 
imbalances.  -­‐ Wind power production will seize reserve capacity to handle deviations between 
actual production and contracted supply in markets for planned traded, as well as to 
handle real-time imbalances. For a given reserve capacity, there will thus be relatively 
less capacity to handle energy imbalances caused by other factors, making the system 
less robust. 
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Increasing wind production may thus also contribute to a falling frequency quality if not dealt 
with in a proper manner. Chapter 6 discusses possible solutions to reduce imbalances caused 
by the deviation between actual and contracted delivery that are caused by forecasting error 
form wind power. More reserve capacity will then be available to handle other sources of 
frequency deviations. We discuss various solutions to handle wind power, including:  -­‐ Providing a more efficient intraday market with trading closer to the operating 
moment.  -­‐ Introducing wind power brokers. -­‐ Introducing shorter trading units in the markets for planned trade -­‐ Introducing down-regulating options in RKOM.  
 
As mentioned above, also the measures discussed in relation to rapid load changes and light 
system operation in chapter 5, will ease the handling of increased wind. This also applies to 
increased flexibility of demand, as discussed in chapter 7. Flexible demand can open for new 
solutions in the energy system in the future and it can contribute to providing a better 
frequency quality by addressing all of the three challenges that this thesis stipulates.  
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5. Market design: Trading units and ramping rules 
Statnett (2012b) highlights that frequency deviations often occur during times of large 
changes in load, and thus often around hourly shifts. Some of the main reasons for this are 
related to consumption and ramping as discussed in chapter 4. The key question of this 
chapter will be how the market design can improve in order to handle the challenges. Here we 
discuss two solutions: i) the size of trading units in the two markets for planned trade, and ii) 
the ramping rules on the interconnectors. In this respect, note that the term structural 
imbalances refers to imbalances that occur due to limitations of market design. (Statnett SF 
2012a)  
 
5.1. Trading units in the markets for planned trade 
An optimal market design would imply that supply and demand could be cleared continuously 
based on all relevant information at all time. However, this is not possible in real life, given 
the constraints of physical laws as well as constraints related to provide viable markets for 
trading electricity. The market design partly represents ways to handle the physics of the 
system and adjust the market to the systems needs. The choice of a 60-minute based trading 
unit the spot- and intraday market is one of these constraints.  
 
5.1.1. 60-minute trading units 
In the two markets for planned trade, ELSPOT and ELBAS, electricity is traded in units 
covering an hour, i.e. 60-minutes. This implies that prices, quantities and balance settlements 
are done for each hour as a whole. The settlements thus do not address any movements or 
load changes within the hour, which of course are continuous. This implies that there can be 
significant structural imbalances within one hour, even if the market is in balance over the 60-
minute period. Figure 20 is used for the purpose of showing how the market clearing 
quantities will deviate from the actual consumption, given today’s market design. (Statnett SF 
2012a) 
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The figure is constructed by Statnett (2012a) as a theoretical example and shows a market 
cleared in 60-minute trading units (the columns) and actual consumption (the line). The 
difference between the two is structural imbalance, created because the market is not cleared 
on continuous basis. The imbalances has to be eliminated in order to at all times ensure the 
right energy balance in the system. Statnett organizes this in two ways: -­‐ By moving production with up to 15 minutes from what’s determined in the 
production plans of the producers. This is, however, not necessary an economically 
optimal solution because Statnett does not have sufficient information to move 
production in a cost efficient way. -­‐ By using reserves when imbalances occur. This implies that less reserve capacity will 
be available to handle imbalances caused by other factors. The result is the need of 
more reserves, or alternatively a less robust system, which will contribute to decreased 
frequency quality.  
 
5.1.2. 15 minute trading units 
As an alternative to trade and settle by 60-minute trading units in the markets, trade and 
settlement could alternatively be based on 15-minute units. The main advantage of using 
shorter units can be seen by looking at Figure 21. This figure is based upon the same 
theoretical example as Figure 20, and the same data is used. The difference is that, in this 
example is, the market cleared in 15-minute units. The result is that market clearing quantities 
Figure 20: Market cleared consumption for 60-minute units and actual consumption.  
The figure is constructed for illustrational purposes but based on actual data. (Statnett 
SF 2012a) 
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follows the actual consumption much closer. Therefore the structural imbalances are 
decreased, contributing an improved frequency quality. This is partly due to less imbalances, 
and partly because less reserve capacity is used to handle structural. Using shorter trading 
units thus also reduces frequency deviations around hourly shifts.    
 
Statnett uses the enrolled production plans today and moves production manually with up to 
15 minutes in order to try to eliminate the structural imbalances caused by 60-minute trading 
units. By organizing trade and settlement by 15 minute units, the market will take over some 
of this balancing work and do it automatically and in a cost efficient way.   
 
5.1.3. Additional advantages from implementing 15-minute trading units 
Frequency quality will be improved by changing the trading units in the markets for planning 
because structural imbalances will be decreased. However, the change in market design also 
holds three other desired advantages:  -­‐ 15-minute trading units represents a step towards a more real time market solution, 
where the market is cleared more often. This will give more correct prices within the 
hour, since trade can be made on a more accurate level. (Statnett SF 2012a) -­‐ Compared to the alternative of 60-minute trading units, a 15-minute based trading 
market reduces structural imbalances. This is in effect probably done better than the 
current alternative where Statnett exercises production movements manually. This is 
based on the assumption that Statnett does not have all required information to move 
production in an economically efficient way. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
Figure 21: Market cleared consumption for 15-minute units and actual 
consumption. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
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-­‐ 15-minute units will enable us to redefine the current ramping rules and apply 
continuous ramping. This will imply important advantages, both from an economic 
perspective and from the perspective of improving frequency quality. (Statnett SF 
2012a) The subject will be discussed further in chapter 5.2. 
 
Lastly, an interesting question is why we have focused on 15-minute trading units in 
particular. In principle, building on the arguments above, even shorter trading units, such as 
10-, 5- or even one-minute trading units could represent a more efficient market solution. 
Likewise, a further question is why not try 45-, 30- or 20-minute units before we scale all the 
way down to 15? The questions are legitimate. Though they are not covered in this thesis, 
they should be addressed. Our discussion reflects principle arguments for reducing the trading 
unit, arguments that apply to all trading units less than an hour. For example, the discussion 
highlights the important aspect of how the implementation of shorter trading units such as 15-
minutes significantly reduce the structural imbalances in the market. 
 
5.1.4. Challenges when implementing 15-minute trading units 
There are however several challenges connected to changing the trading and settlement units 
in the system:  
 
Firstly is the political -and law interconnection with Europe. Norway and the Nordic 
synchronous system are closely interlinked with the rest of Europe through the EU, EEA and 
the organization ENTSO-E, which is a joint organization for European TSOs. The EU has the 
intention of a common European law for the power system, including rules of market design. 
(European Commission 2012) This implies that the EU most probably must decide upon 15-
minute trading units in order for the Nordic power market to implement the design. Statnett 
can, through lobbying activities, try to make the EU adapt the market solution. They do 
however have limited actual power to change market design. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 
Secondly, changes in the market design of the day-ahead and the intraday markets also affect 
the design of the markets for ancillary services. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) If trading units are 
reduced to 15-minutes, this also has to be done in the day-based market for FCR and in RKM. 
It will not be practical to only have the possibility to trade in these ancillary service markets 
on hourly basis, if one already has made varying obligations within that hour in the markets 
for planning. RKM in addition uses the spot market price as information input.  
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Thirdly, there will be a need for better measuring devices in the power transmission system if 
15-minute trading units were to be implemented. This would imply a major one-time 
investment. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 
5.2. Ramping rules 
Ramping of the interconnectors occurs when the load on the cables is changed. This is most 
often done when the cables are turned either from export to import, or from import to export. 
Ramping often involves large load changes for the energy system since the interconnectors 
have high transmission capacities. Statnett has imposed ramping rules, which limits ramping 
to a specific speed and time period. This is in order to protect the power system, ensuring that 
it is able to accommodate these large changes in load. To a large extent the rules reflect the 
current market design. However, if trading and settlement units of the system were shortened 
for example from 60 to 15 minutes, this would give Statnett the opportunity to change current 
ramping rules. This can help improve frequency quality and have desired economic effects.  
 
5.2.1. Current ramping rules 
The ramping restrictions we have today have two important limitations (Statnett SF 2012b): -­‐ Ramping can only be carried out in the twenty minute period of ten minutes before the 
hourly shift to ten minutes past the hourly shift. -­‐ Maximal ramping speed is 30 MW/min.  
Figure 22 shows a simplistic example of structural imbalances due to ramping, given the 
current market design. Contracted obligations of production discretely change from hour to 
hour. Focusing only on the need of ramping, the change of load on the cable (ramping) occurs 
continually within the twenty minute period around the hourly shift. The difference between 
these is the structural imbalance due to ramping.  Structural imbalances occur because the 
interconnector starts to ramp ten minutes before hour shift, but the production changes in 
accordance with the market. In Statnett SF 2012a we calculated the maximal imbalance size 
to 300 MW per cable for the current ramping restrictions.5 (Statnett SF 2012a) 
                                                
5 The calculation was done by the author of this thesis as part of Statnett SF 2012a. See Appendix I. for 
calculation, assumptions and method.   
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5.2.2. Continuous ramping 
Continuous ramping implies that ramping is done as a continually ongoing process within the 
whole hour, i.e. not limited to 20 minutes for each hour. This can contribute to decreasing 
structural imbalances, if implemented alongside with 15-minute trading units in the markets 
for planned trade. Figure 23 shows a simplistic example, similar to the one in Figure 22, using 
15-minute trading units and a continuous ramping speed of 20 MW/min. The maximal 
structural imbalance is reduced to 150 MW looking at the same time period as above.6 It is 
possible because the market is cleared for one quarter at the time and therefore is able to 
handle load changes from ramping in a better way. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 
                                                
6 The calculation is done by the author of this thesis as part of Statnett SF 2012a. See Appendix I.  
Figure 22: Structural imbalances with 60-minute trading units and current 
ramping restrictions. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
Figure 23: Structural imbalances with 15-minute trading units and 
continuous ramping. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
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The structural imbalance also depends upon the chosen ramping speed. Table 27 shows the 
structural imbalances of this example using 15-minute trading units and continuous ramping, 
calculated for different ramping speeds. We see that these solutions offer lower structural 
imbalances for all speeds than what is possible with today’s market design. The example has 
illustrated the principal effects of continuous ramping, reduced trading units, and different 
ramping speeds. Note however that further analysis is necessary to find an optimal solution. 
As for now can we only conclude that continuous ramping will provide better frequency 
quality, by making the load changes from ramping easier to handle. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 
  
5.2.3. Additional advantages from implementing continuous ramping 
Continuous ramping, even at lower speeds than 30 MW/min, provides higher total ramping 
over the hour, thus in effect increasing the transmission capacity available. As such, the 
economic gains from implementing continuous ramping can be large. Using the ramping rate 
of 20 MW/min as an example, Figure 248 shows how the capacity of an interconnector better 
can be utilized with continuous ramping, compared to today’s ramping (Statnett SF 2012a). 
We can see that this solution offers more available capacity since the whole hour can be 
utilized for ramping and not only 20 minutes. 
                                                
7 The calculation was done by the author of this thesis as part of Statnett SF 2012a. See Appendix I. 
8 The figure was made by the author of this thesis as part of Statnett SF 2012a. See Appendix II. 
Table 2: Structural imbalances for different ramping speeds. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
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Table 39 displays changes in capacity utilizations, using the current market solution and 
ramping restrictions as a reference. Continuous ramping can give significant increases in 
capacity usage, even for low ramping speeds. (Statnett SF 2012a) To estimate the specific 
economic gains from increased interconnector capacity, however, further research is required.  
 
 
Table 3: Increased capacity by using continuous ramping, compared with the current ramping restrictions. (Statnett 
SF 2012a) 
 
5.2.4 Challenges with implementing continuous ramping 
There are two major challenges connected to implementing continuous ramping.  -­‐ As already pointed out it will not be desirable to implement continuous ramping if the 
trading units in the markets for planned trade are not shortened. Hereby arises the 
same challenges as discussed earlier with respect to the development in Europe. 
(Statnett SF 2012a) -­‐ An interconnector has two landing points and is therefore dependent on the 
coordination of the two power systems. As an example, it will not be possible for 
                                                
9 The calculation is done by the author of this thesis as part of Statnett SF 2012a. See Appendix III. 
Figure 24: Ramping of an interconnector using continuous ramping speed 
of 20 MW/min and today’s ramping rules. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
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Statnett to implement continuous ramping on the interconnector between Norway and 
the Netherlands if TenneT10 does not agree. This might imply that the use of 
continuous ramping depend upon whether also countries connected to Norway 
introduce shorter trading units in their markets for planned trade. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Tennet is a Dutch TSO, and part owner of NorNed, which is the interconnector between Norway and the 
Netherlands.  
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6. Handling wind power production 
Wind power producers will increasingly enter the energy system the next few years. Being 
highly unregulated and a less predictable production source than hydropower, increased wind 
power poses new challenges for frequency quality. We will look into alternative adjustments 
of market design that may secure a sufficient frequency quality. To understand the underlying 
challenges of wind power predictions, section 6.1 starts by discussing aspects of forecasting. 
The chapter proceeds by arguing that in addition to the use of reserves, additional measures 
are needed to handle the variations and unpredictability of wind power. Before discussing 
possible market design solutions that enable a better handling of wind power unpredictability 
in section 6.3, section 6.2 discusses the solution of how they handle wind power in Germany. 
This is a country that has invested heavily in wind power the last years. 
 
6.1. Why is wind power production a threat to frequency quality? 
Wind power causes system imbalances because the actual production often will deviate from 
the market commitments given by the traded contracts. According to Lars Fogt Andersen at 
energinet.dk (the Danish TSO) actual wind power production can often deviate from spot 
market bids by 30-40% (Karas 2009). These deviations in principle increase the imbalances 
that must be handled by reserves. We will shortly discuss the challenges of forecasting wind 
power, as well as the additional strain on reserves that increased wind power creates.  
 
6.1.1. Forecasting wind power 
The problem with production forecasts for wind is not connected to the total amount of wind 
power within one day, but rather at what time wind fronts reach the wind turbines (Karas 
2009). This creates problems because producers need to make bids in the markets for planned 
trade, for all the 60-minute trading units of the delivery day. Thus, forecasting uncertainty 
leads to deviations between planned and actual production. There are three interesting aspects 
of wind power forecasting: -­‐ Compared to the forecasts of individual wind parks, aggregated forecasts for wind 
power can decrease forecast error through the diversity and geographical spread of the 
wind parks. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) This underlines the importance of understanding the 
greater picture of wind power production.  
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-­‐ High wind speeds can give rapid load changes in the system, because wind turbines 
have safety limits for excessive wind speeds. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) The result can be 
that large wind parks may go from maximal to zero production in a short period of 
time, thus causing large system imbalances.  -­‐ Forecasting error decreases over time as the moment of production closes in. This can 
be seen in Figure 25. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) Forecasts improves with 2-3% of installed 
capacity from when the spot market closes and up until the operating moment. This 
provides interesting features for the trade of wind power production.  
 
6.1.2. Increased demand for ancillary services 
By handling the imbalances created by wind power through the current balancing systems, the 
system consequently uses reserves to handle frequency deviations caused by wind power 
production. However, there are two disadvantages of mainly relying on the use of reserves for 
this purpose:   -­‐ Imbalances caused by wind power will increase the use of reserves, thereby utilizing a 
large part of the available reserve capacity. This implies that less capacity will be 
available to handle imbalances caused by other factors. The result may be a less robust 
system, which may contribute to decreased frequency quality.  -­‐ Wind power production will also increase the cost of using reserves. Firstly, the 
increased demand for reserves give higher prices for reserves, given that the markets 
are cleared using marginal price. Secondly, for a given demand for electricity, wind 
power production implies a decrease in flexible hydropower production, also in 
Figure 25: Mean absolute error as % of installed capacity in 2010 for Denmark West 
(DK1) of the short range forecast. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) 
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situations with light system operation. In turn, this will increase the prices for rotating 
reserves in these periods.  
These two disadvantages indicate that we should try to seek additional solutions to handle the 
balancing problems of wind power production.  
 
6.2. Wind power responsibility 
It can be interesting to look at models for handling wind power production in other countries, 
since the wind power industry in Norway is quite new. Germany is one of the countries in the 
world that has invested the most in new renewable power production in the recent years, with 
a total of 6.4% of the nation’s electricity produced by wind power in 2010(Federal Minister 
for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety 2011).   
 
In Norway wind power producers are responsible for their bids in ELSPOT and ELBAS, as 
well as for the energy imbalances that occur. Germany, however, has chosen a different 
model. Here the TSOs11 are responsible for handling wind power. The TSOs are obligated, by 
the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) Act of August 1, 2004, to accept and use all production 
from wind power, and compensate the wind producers for the power they supply accordingly. 
The payments are predetermined and predictable feed-in tariffs.(Germany Trade and Invest 
2013) The wind power producers do not have any market obligations and do not need to make 
wind forecasts or market bids. Forecasts and production plans becomes the TSOs 
responsibility even though they do not own or operate the wind turbines. (TransnetBW GmbH 
2013) 
 
Alleged arguments for using the German model of handling wind power are: -­‐ The model can increase frequency quality by gathering all responsibility of wind 
power handling with the TSOs. They will have the opportunity to make production 
plans on an aggregated basis. By using aggregated forecasts can the TSOs decrease the 
forecast error as indicated by the research findings of Nilssen, et al. (2010) -­‐ TSOs may have greater opportunities to make investments in good forecasts. Small 
wind power producers might not have the same investment opportunity, given capital 
and knowledge constraints. The TSOs can in this way ensure themselves against 
inaccurate forecasts that create imbalances that must be handled.  
                                                
11 Germany has four TSOs: TransnetBW (the former EnBW Transportnetze), 50Hertz Transmission, Am-prion 
and TenneT. 
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-­‐ The TSOs can forecast wind power production right up until the operating moment 
and make adjustments continuously according to forecast changes, also taking 
advantage of the decreasing forecasting error over time (Nilssen, et al (2010)). 
 
However, two disadvantages may also be asserted as to this German model of handling wind 
power: -­‐ The model may not be optimal form an economic perspective. Important economic 
incentives and information regarding a significant share of total production will be 
omitted from the market, thereby contributing to the possibility of a non-optimal 
market clearing.  -­‐ Feed-in tariffs provide high and stable prices for producers who have marginal costs 
close to zero, also affecting the optimality of the resulting market clearing prices.  
Davidson (2012) says that the German approach is an example of a scheme where the 
considerations of physics and political subsidy financing seemingly has been stressed to a 
larger extent than market efficiency, implicitly undermining the energy market. Based on 
this, our tentative conclusion is that the German approach to balancing wind power does 
not seem to be an optimal solution. In stead we will consider other market design 
adjustments within the Norwegian approach.  
 
6.3. Possible market solutions for handling wind power 
We will consider four market solutions that might contribute to a better handling of wind 
power imbalances, thereby also better ensuring a sufficient frequency quality. 
i. Increased trade in the intraday market. 
ii. Introduction of brokers for wind power trade 
iii. Shorter time units in the markets for planned trade. 
iv. Introduce down-regulating options in the option market for manual reserves.  
 
6.3.1. Increased trade in the intraday market 
The intraday market is the market where Norwegian market participants can trade up until 
two hours before operating hour. It thus can be used to alter obligations made in the spot 
market. The spot market is cleared 12 to 36 hours prior to the operating moment. This implies 
that a lot of new information occurs between the time of spot market clearing and the time of 
production. From Nilssen, et al. (2010) have we seen that forecasting closer to the operating 
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moment can reduce forecast error for wind power. Trade in the intraday market can thus 
contribute to balancing wind power production. Wind power producers can, by trading in the 
intraday market, act proactive to eliminate forecasting error, as forecasts become more 
accurate. This will be a more desired solution than Statnett using reserves to act upon 
imbalances when they occur. By trading in the intraday market can both the need for reserve 
usage be decreased and the frequency quality improved. There are, however, several 
problems: 
 
The intraday market today is not liquid, and only holds very limited amounts of trade by 
Norwegian actors. There are mainly two reasons for this. Firstly, Norwegian energy 
production today is predictable and easy to control, so trade in the intraday market is seldom 
needed (Statnett SF 2012a). We might expect this to change, as more unpredictable energy 
production will enter the system. Secondly is there no market maker in the Norwegian part of 
the intraday market (Nord Pool Spot 2013f). A market maker is a company that commits to 
provide both buy and sell orders. As of the end of 2011 was there three market markers in 
ELBAS, however none of them were responsible for providing bids in Norway.  
 
The gate closure in the intraday market is two hours before operating hour for 
Norwegian participants. However, in 2015 Statnett will decrease gate closure from two to one 
hour before operating hour. This may increase domestic trade in the intraday market for two 
reasons: -­‐ Information improves significantly between two and one hour before operating hour. 
(Nilssen, et al. 2010) This gives the market participants more accurate information to 
trade upon.  -­‐ Approximately 40% of trade in ELBAS occurs in the last hour of trade before the 
market closes (Statnett SF 2012a). This trade is by non-Norwegian actors since the 
Norwegian actors are excluded from the market in this period. Allowing them to trade 
in the last hour will give them access to important market bids.  
On this basis we assume that a later gate closure will benefit the efficiency and liquidity of the 
intraday market. As the TSO is dependent upon time for load planning after the market is 
closed, however, a later gate closure adds further challenges for the TSO. (Statnett SF 2012a) 
This is also an issue in the discussions of possible gate closure even closer to the time of 
delivery. In this respect, it might be that future technological development can decrease the 
need for planning time. 
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Bids by wind power producers in the intraday market will be highly affected by the 
marginal costs of imbalances. This is the cost that Statnett imposes on the producers for not 
being in balance, through the balance settlements. The balance settlements can therefore be 
seen as important economic incentives for wind power producers to trade in the intraday 
market. Note that in principle the other participants in the intraday market will be either 
flexible hydropower producers or other wind power producers:  -­‐ Wind power can trade with other wind power in the intraday market.(Nilssen, et al. 
2010)(Statnett SF 2012a) (Mauritzen 2012).  -­‐ Flexible hydropower producers do not trade in the intraday market today, mainly 
because their production is highly predictable and easy to regulate. An important 
question, however, is whether these hydropower producers will increase their trade in 
the intraday market when more wind power is introduced in the system. Basically, this 
will depend on the prices, and the marginal costs of the hydropower producers. Firstly, 
hydropower producers have an optimal production curve, and a deviation from this 
would imply efficiency losses. In addition hydropower production has marginal costs 
of production, including water value. Their compensation for trading in the intraday 
market must therefore exceed their total marginal cost of changing production. Future 
trade by hydropower producers thus depend upon the prices in this market, and thus 
implicitly also upon the balancing costs which motivate wind power trade in this 
market. From a system perspective, trade in the intraday market is more efficient if the 
marginal costs of the flexible hydropower producer are lower than the costs of 
handling imbalances in the balancing market. 
 
These aspects provide the rationale for trade in the intraday market. Further gains in trade 
may also potentially follow from investments in the transmission grid to the extent it enables 
trade between wind power producers at different geographical locations with forecast errors 
that don’t correlate. (Nilssen, et al. 2010).  
 
6.3.2. Rational market participants or wind power brokers? 
Rational market participants represent important premises to achieve efficient markets. It 
might, however, be debated whether all wind power producers can be expected to act 
professional in the intraday market. Let us therefore categorize the wind power producers in 
two categories:  
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-­‐ Large power producing companies that have invested in wind power. -­‐ Small-scale wind power producers.  
The large power producing companies, like Statkraft and Agder Energi, have good knowledge 
of the market and can be expected to act as rational profit maximizing companies. It is 
therefore only a matter of incentives to make them participate in the intraday market to 
balance their wind power. However, small-scale wind power producers might not have the 
same professionalism. Even if we assume that they are profit seeking, they might lack the 
capital or knowledge necessary. There are, however, two reasons why it will be important to 
get small-scale wind power producers involved in the intraday market:  -­‐ We can expect that their spot market bids will not be highly accurate. Thus, they can 
potentially eliminate large imbalances by trading in the intraday market.  -­‐ Wind power trade by wind power producers with opposite implied imbalances implies 
potential lower costs in offsetting anticipated imbalances. In addition, small-scale 
producers may be important to provide liquidity in the market.  
An implication is that a study of the decision making by small-scale producers could provide 
important information regarding their market involvement, also advising Statnett and NVE of 
possible measures to increase market participation of this group. For the reasons discussed 
above, this may in turn indirectly result in an improved frequency quality.  
 
Small-scale wind power producers might thus to some extent lack knowledge, capital or time 
to trade in the markets for electricity. One solution to this problem can be to encourage 
brokers that act on behalf of small-scale producers in the spot and intraday market. These 
brokers can specialize in trade of wind power production and trade on an aggregated level. 
This provides two main advantages: -­‐ The brokers can invest in good wind forecasting tools achieving economics of scale 
since they act on behalf of several producers. -­‐ The brokers bids in ELSPOT and ELBAS can to some extent be aggregated for 
producers in the same area. As Nilssen, et al. (2010) presented will this give the 
opportunity to decrease forecast error.  
 
6.3.3. Shorter trading units in the markets for planned trade 
Reducing the trading units to 15 minutes in the markets for planned trade was discussed in 
chapter 5. This can provide two desired effects for handling wind power production. Firstly, 
we argued that by introducing 15-minute trading units less resources and reserves are used on 
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structural imbalances from hydropower production and ramping. A consequence is that for a 
given capacity of reserves, more reserves will become available for wind power. Secondly 
will 15-minute trading units provide wind power producers with the opportunity to trade in 
the intraday market more often and closer into the operating moment. (Nilssen, et al. 2010) 
 
6.3.4. Down-regulating options in RKOM 
Light system operation, partly due to the introduction of more wind power, implies that the 
system stands less robust to handle frequency deviations. This is because in times of more 
wind power production, less flexible hydropower facilities are operating. Flexible hydropower 
producers, however, must produce in order to be able to deliver down-regulating capacity and 
rotating reserves. More specifically, this implies that increased wind production may imply 
even more shortage of down-regulating capacity in the spring and summer than the case is 
today. A future challenge will then be to ensure sufficient down-regulating capacity in the 
market for manual reserves 
 
The available capacity in the RKM market depends upon the bids from producers. Today, in 
the strained winter months, the RKOM market has been implemented to provide sufficient up-
regulating capacity. This is done by the trading of up-regulating capacity options. Increased 
wind power production however may imply a scarcity of down-regulating capacity in times of 
large wind power production.  
 
A proposed solution to provide sufficient down-regulating capacity in RKM will then be to 
introduce options for down-regulating capacity in RKOM, making this market operational in 
the spring and summer when the problem of light system operation is most crucial. This will 
both provide down-regulating capacity for manual reserves and at the same time offer rotating 
reserve capacity since the flexible producers must have running plants to offer down-
regulating manual reserves. In this way can the system become more robust to handle light 
system operation in a future energy system with more wind power production.  
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7. Flexible consumption 
In addressing the frequency quality of the system, we have addressed issues of production as 
well as cross-border trading. Implicitly, we have assumed that consumption is unregulated. 
However, we will briefly in this chapter also point out the potential of flexible consumption in 
maintaining the quality of frequency. 
 
7.1. Advantages of flexible consumption  
Consumption has historically been assumed as unregulated. This is partly because the largest 
share of consumers are small-scale and do not trade directly in the organized markets, nor are 
directly affected by the balancing markets. However, Smart Grid solutions and flexible 
demand are foreseen to be a vital part of the future energy system, thus being the subject of 
research and testing at a current basis.(Statnett SF 2011c)  
 
Flexible demand can offer important advantages for the energy balance by providing a more 
even load pattern within the day: -­‐ It can decrease rapid load changes in the morning and evening and thereby frequency 
deviations that occur in these periods. -­‐ It can contribute to the supply of reserve capacity in peak demand periods by offering 
up-regulating reserves in RKM. -­‐ It can contribute to the supply of reserve capacity during light system operation by 
offering down-regulating reserves in RKM.  -­‐ It can contribute to less congestion in the transmission grid. 
We will discuss flexible demand separately for industrial and small-scale consumers, as they 
are different in their market involvement and flexibility potential.  
 
7.1.1. Industrial flexible demand 
Industrial consumers have a stable and predictable demand. However, they can, given their 
size, be important contributors to providing a better energy balance. IPA Consulting, 
Econnect Ltd and Martin Energy (2006) indicate that flexible demand from industrial 
consumers is one of the most important technical developments for the power system in Great 
Britain for the future. They highlight that flexible demand can contribute to fill the increasing 
demand for manual reserves resulting from a shift from thermal to wind production.  
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There can be two ways to organize flexible demand from industrial consumers: -­‐ Consumers can make manual reserve bids directly. Some Norwegian actors do this 
today in peak demand hours.  However, most of them can only supply one or two 
hours at a time. (Statnett SF 2012b) -­‐ The most common way, however, is that an agent makes agreements with several 
industrial consumers and bids on their behalf in the market for manual reserve on an 
aggregated level (Statnett SF 2011c). The agreements can be customized to the 
companies needs.  
 
An important question, however, is whether there are incentives for the industrial consumers 
to supply manual reserves. Their marginal costs are related to the costs of changing their own 
production plans, or of using alternative back-up power sources. The ability to supply this 
flexibility may also require specific investments. If sufficient compensation is only available 
for some periods of a year, this can lead to the actors not contributing to the market at all, in 
particular when income is needed to cover these investments. However, the prices for reserves 
are expected to increase in the future (Statnett SF 2012a) (Pöyry management consulting 
2011). This might be enough to make more large-scale consumers participate in the market. 
Thus the supply of reserve capacity by these consumers are highly dependent upon the 
economic incentives provided by the system.  
 
7.1.2. Small-scale consumers and smart grids 
Small-scale consumers have a volatile load pattern over the day and are in principle highly 
inflexible and unregulated. However, this can be expected to change with the introduction of 
smart grids. Smart grids can be defined in several ways, since the concept does not originate 
from one specific technology (Statnett SF 2011c). NVE (2011) uses the following definition:  
“A Smart Grid is an electric power network that utilizes two-way communication and 
control-technologies to cost efficiently integrate the behaviour and actions of all users 
connected to it – in order to ensure an economically efficient and sustainable power system 
with low losses and high levels of quality, security of supply and safety.”  
This definition holds promising aspects for the future energy system. However, there are key 
economic mechanisms that need to be designed properly in order to extract all potential of 
this technology.  
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The main idea of flexible consumption is to make the demand curve more elastic, thereby 
making consumer actions more affected by prices. By doing so, a more elastic demand may 
result in a more even consumption pattern within the day. However, this implies that adequate 
information is channeled to the consumers. Here we will only briefly note two major ways 
that that flexible demand can been organized for small-scale consumers: -­‐ Small-scale consumers can adjust their consumption to real prices individually, 
manually or automatically. For example can hot water tanks be disconnected for a 
number of hours or the washing machine can be run in the night instead of the day. 
This may contribute to shaving peak loads, also making the consumption pattern less 
volatile. However, in this case the consumers will not operate as reserve capacity, only 
as price sensitive consumers.  -­‐ Statnett (2011c) indicates that flexible consumption will be most efficient if done by 
aggregators with the possibility to disconnecting consumers. The consumers are 
compensated both for their supply of capacity and for actual disconnections. In this 
case, the aggregated actions of consumers can be used as reserve capacity in the 
market for manual reserves.  
It is important to note that the two stipulated arrangements do not exclude each other. Both 
can be used, and they will both contribute with desired effects for the energy balance.   
 
Smart grid solutions are still in a testing and research phase, but it is expected to become a 
part of the future energy system (Statnett SF 2011c). It is important that Statnett studies the 
possibilities that the technology enables. They need to be ready when the technology is 
sufficiently developed, being able to provide the right economic incentives and necessary real 
time information, also considering e.g. the effect of different network tariff billing, also with 
respect to time or load differentiation of the tariffs.  
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8. Conclusion 
Frequency deviations are indicators of frequency quality, which determines the security of 
power supply in the system. The quality in the Nordic synchronous system has decreased the 
past ten years. In this paper we have identified three challenges for providing a sufficient 
frequency quality in the future. The three challenges have been addressed so that possible 
solutions based on economic incentives, could be presented:  -­‐ Rapid load changes cause structural imbalances and frequency deviations, mainly 
around hour shifts. This challenge can be addressed by implementing shorter trading 
units in the markets for planned trade and continuous ramping on the interconnectors.  -­‐ Light system operation makes the system less robust to handle frequency deviations. 
Down-regulating options for manual reserves can increase bids in RKM and thereby 
provide more available capacity.  -­‐ Wind power production is unregulated and hard to forecast. This can be addressed by 
increasing trade in the intraday market, introducing brokers for wind power, 
implementing shorter trading units in the markets for planning and implementing 
down-regulating options for manual reserves.  -­‐ Flexible demand can in addition contribute to increased frequency quality by 
providing manual reserves and a more even load pattern.  
It is important to note that the solutions purposed will not alone eliminate the challenges of 
energy imbalances. Economic, technical and political factors will influence the frequency 
quality and must all be researched in great detail.  
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Appendix 
I. Calculations of structural imbalances from ramping: 
The calculations of structural imbalances are based on the following: 
time of ramping without load changes * ramping speed 
Structural imbalance from ramping with the current ramping restrictions:  
10 minutes * 30 MW/min = 300 MW 
 Structural imbalance by using continuous ramping and 15 minute trading blocks:  
 (15 minutes / 2) *30 MW/min = 225 MW 
(15 minutes / 2) *20 MW/min = 150 MW 
(15 minutes / 2) *15 MW/min = 112,5 MW 
(15 minutes / 2) *10 MW/min = 75 MW 
The reason why the time period of ramping can be divided by two is that the market is cleared 
in 15 minute units and continuous ramping is used. The market can therefore be cleared in 
better adapted steps to follow ramping, as displayed in Figure 23.   
 
II. Calculations and assumptions behind Figure 24: 
Assumptions for the calculations: 
• The figure is made in excel where one unit is equivalent to one minute. 
• The cable has a capacity of 1400 MW. This implies that total ramping to turn the cable 
from export to import (or the other way) must be 2800 MW. 
• Current ramping rules restricts ramping to ten minutes before and after hourly shifts at 
a speed of 30 MW/min. This gives a total ramping capacity of 600 MW per hour.  
• The continuous ramping is done at a speed of 20 MW/min. This provides a total 
ramping over one hour of 1200 MW. 
• Ramping of the cables starts at the same time. This will not necessarily be the case in 
reality and is done for simplifying purpose. One important effect is that the numbers 
presented are case specific and cannot be utilized in a general matter.  
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III. Calculations and assumptions behind Table 3: 
• The calculations are based on the same assumptions as for Figure 24, however the 
continuous ramping speed is changed so that calculations can be made for different 
speeds.  
• The calculations are done as follows: 
o Excel is used to make the two graphs of interest (continuous ramping and 
current ramping restrictions) at the different continuous ramping speeds of 
interest.  
o Capacity utilized is calculated per minute and is MW of utilized capacity of the 
cable. Absolute value is used, meaning that both import and export is positive 
capacity use of the cable. The cable will therefore start with a capacity usage 
of 1400 MW and end at 1400 MW, with the total change of 2800 MW. Thus 
when the cable is turned “half way” the capacity usage is 0 MW.  
o The difference in utilized capacity between the two solutions can be calculated 
as percentage. Calculations are done as follows: 
(Total capacity utilized by continuous ramping – Total capacity utilized 
by current ramping) / Total capacity utilized by current ramping 
o The total utilized capacity is measured from when both solutions start ramping 
until the last is finished.  
o The figure under is taken from Statnett (2012a) and illustrates current ramping 
restrictions compared to continuous ramping at 20 MW/min. The continuous 
ramping is done in 140 minutes (2800 MW / (20 MW/min)). Current ramping 
restrictions will utilize 264 minutes (4 hours with 600 MW/hour and 13,3 
minutes at the speed of 30 MW/min). 
• The numbers presented are case specific given the assumptions made. They can 
therefore not be utilized in a general matter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: (Statnett SF 2012a) 
